
On February 20 of last year, I told you about one of the more shocking workplace disasters of recent times — the Imperial Sugar explosion:
On Friday, February 8, the Imperial Sugar processing plant in Port Wentworth, Georgia, exploded.
The explosion killed at least eight workers and sent dozens more to the hospital. It took firefighters a week to put out the fire.
What could cause such a massive disaster?
The culprit is what experts call “combustible dust” — tiny particles of certain materials (like sugar) that are thrown off in manufacturing and agricultural processes. Unless steps are taken to disperse the particles, they build up inside buildings, and then all it takes is a stray spark of static electricity and — devastation.
That early report noted eight deaths, but by the time the toll was fully counted, that figure had risen to fourteen. 36 more workers had been injured.
Well, yesterday the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) released the final report on their investigation of that disaster, and they found that the explosion — and all the human tragedy it caused — was “entirely preventable”:
The report said company officials long knew the dangers of combustible sugar dust, which the board and other agencies say fueled the inferno.
“The explosion at Imperial Sugar was entirely preventable, and the deaths and injuries … should not have happened,” board chairman John Bresland said at a news conference.
Citing “poor equipment design, poor maintenance and poor housekeeping,” Bresland said, “It’s not rocket science; it really isn’t.”
But just as in the CSB investigation into the T2 disaster, while the Board is full of bark about how this particular combustible dust accident happened, their recommendations to OSHA as to how to prevent a similar disaster from happening again are disturbingly free of bite: “Proceed expeditiously, consistent with the Chemical Safety Board’s November 2006 recommendation and OSHA’s announced intention to conduct rulemaking, to promulgate a comprehensive dust standard to reduce or eliminate hazards from fire and explosion combustible powders and dust.”
As Change to Win health and safety coordinator Eric Frumin explained to the Charleston Gazette, “proceed expeditiously” doesn’t actually require that we see a standard for preventing combustible dust explosions issued anytime soon:
Expeditious? What does that mean? Normal OSHA schedules for new standards take many years — 10 years for grain dust explosions; 6 years and counting for crane disasters. Is expeditious half of that? I hope not, but we can’t wait to find out.
Is that the best advice that the Board can offer about the urgency of this crisis with dust hazards? If so, then this Board ought to re-read its charter. Especially after the Congress has even proposed specific legislation to bypass the problems with “emergency” standards, and give OSHA the authority to adopt a temporary fix while the final standard is in the works. Why won’t the Board at least endorse that solution?
The Board knows that major corporations cannot be trusted to take urgent preventive action on their own. That’s why we have safety laws with mandatory standards and enforcement. It’s too bad the Board still fails to act like they believe in them.
One can easily imagine a watchdog that’s all bark and no bite. But that’s not the watchdog I’d want guarding my house.
